A companion paper, Sanchirico (1996a), provides a probabilistic theory of learning in games with the convergence property that, almost surely, play will remain almost always (i.e., forever after some point) within one of the stage game's "minimal inclusive sets." This paper investigates the size of minimal inclusive sets in several classes of games, notably, those for which other learning processes have been shown to converge (in various manners weaker than convergence of actual play). These include certain supermodular games, congestion games, potential games, games with identical interests, and games with bandwagon effects. It is shown that in all these classes, if all of a game's pure equilibria are strict (a fortiori, if its payoffs are generic), then all of its minimal inclusive sets will be singletons consisting of Nash equilibria.
Introduction
In recent years, much research has been directed toward formalizing the intuition that common knowledge of strategic intent may arise from repeated interaction.
2 In this vein, Sanchirico (1996) provides a probabilistic theory of learning in games (in a repeated game framework) with the convergence property that, almost surely, play will remain almost always (i.e., forever after some point) within one of the stage game's "minimal inclusive sets 3 " An "inclusive set"
(DEFINITION 1; following Basu and Weibull 4 (1991) ) is a rectangular subset of action profiles with the property that each player's factor includes all best responses to beliefs on the product of her opponents' factors. A minimal inclusive set (DEFINITION 2) is an inclusive set that contains no other inclusive set.
One of the two key assumptions that generate convergence in Sanchirico (1996) is a best response based noise assumption designed to reflect the indeterminacy of strategic interaction.
One byproduct of this assumption is that convergence to any strict subset of a minimal inclusive set is impossible. According to the theory of learning in that paper, therefore, the potency of the learning approach to generate common knowledge of strategic intent varies across games according to the size of the game's minimal inclusive sets. The range of size of these sets is large.
In some games, such as matching pennies, the only minimal inclusive set will be the entire set of (rationalizable 5 ) profiles. In others, such as the battle of the sexes, all minimal inclusive sets will be pure strategy Nash equilibria.
This paper investigates the size of minimal inclusive sets in various classes of games.
Special attention is paid to the several classes for which other learning processes have been shown to converge (in various manners weaker than convergence of actual play). These include, first, (certain) supermodular games (Krishna (1990) ), congestion games (Rosenthal (1973) ), potential games and games with identical interests (Monderer and Shapley (1993a and b) ). In these the beliefs generated by fictitious play have been shown to converge to a mixed equilibrium of the stage game. Also considered are games with bandwagon effects (Kandori and Rob (1992) ), in which the limit population distribution in the evolutionary model of Kandori and Rob (1992a) concentrates on a (particular) pure equilibrium. It is shown that in all such classes, if all of a game's pure equilibria are strict 6 (a fortiori, if its payoffs are generic), then all of the game's minimal inclusive sets will be singletons consisting of strict equilibria.
The paper, therefore, accomplishes two tasks. In the first place, it shows that within the foregoing classes of games the probabilistic learning model in Sanchirico (1996a) generates convergence of actual play to Nash equilibrium. But apart from its connection to Sanchirico (1996a) , the paper has interest in its own right in that it helps to tie together the growing menagerie of seemingly disparate classes of games for which positive convergence results have been obtained.
In broad outline, what these classes have in common are two important properties. The first is that all games within these classes have pure strategy equilibria. The second is that the properties that define these classes are "restrictable" to any one of the game's inclusive sets: that is, for any (rectangular) inclusive set, I, in any game G with the property, the game G I , with strategy space I and payoffs equal to the restriction of G's payoffs to I, also has the property.
(Supermodular games are not restrictable and we will have to modify the definition slightly to make them so.) This in turn implies that for each inclusive set I, the restricted game G I has a pure strategy equilibrium. By the definition "inclusive set," such an equilibrium must also be an equilibrium in G. If all pure equilibria in G are strict, each inclusive set will contain a strict equilibrium in G. But such strict equilibria are themselves inclusive sets. Hence, no minimal inclusive set can be other than a singleton consisting of a pure, strict equilibrium. This argument is formalized in THEOREM 1 (Template).
The work in this paper extends the research reported in Basu and Weibull (1991) . That paper defines and establishes certain properties of inclusive sets and minimal inclusive sets.
These are: i) the existence of minimal inclusive sets in a broad class of games (existence is trivial in the finite games that I consider here); ii) the "tightness" of minimal inclusive sets--the fact that the inclusive property holds with (set) equality for these sets; iii) the fact that every compact inclusive set contains the support of a Nash equilibrium; and iv) the fact that the set of rationalizable profiles is the largest "tight" inclusive set 7 . Basu and Weibull (1991) does not investigate the size of minimal inclusive sets in various classes of games. Nor does it discuss the application of such sets to the context of learning in games.
After presenting the general result discussed above in SECTION 2, I turn in SECTION 3 to the relationship between minimal inclusive sets and mixed equilibria. Then in SECTION 4, I take up supermodular games ((DEFINITION 6; Topkis (1978) , Vives (1990 ), Milgrom and Roberts (1990 ), Milgrom and Shannon (1991 ). Milgrom and Roberts (1991) have shown that if a supermodular game has a unique equilibrium, then any sequence consistent with "sophisticated learning 8 " will converge to that equilibrium. Since supermodular games do not, in general, have unique equilibria (e.g., battle of the sexes), and since, when they do, such an equilibrium will be the game's only serially undominated strategy (Milgrom and Roberts (1990) Theorem 5 and Corollary), this convergence result does not directly address the question of whether learning models can show the formation of common knowledge of strategic intent, given common knowledge of rationality. Krishna (1991) , however, has shown that in a particular subclass of supermodular games--those with completely ordered action spaces and "diminishing" increasing dif and only iferences--the sequence of beliefs generated by fictitious play 9 (whose corresponding sequence of play will be consistent with sophisticated learning) will converge to one of the game's mixed equilibria. In SECTION 4, I show, inter alia, that in all supermodular games with generic payoffs 10 in which each minimal inclusive set is a supermodular game in its own right (which will be the case if action spaces are completely ordered), all minimal inclusive sets will be singletons consisting of strict equilibria (COROLLARY 2).
More recently, Monderer and Shapley (1993a and b) have investigated the properties of fictitious play in "potential games," (which include Rosenthal's (1973) "congestion games") and games "with identical interests 11 " (DEFINITIONS 9 and 14, respectively). These authors show in Monderer and Shapley (1993a) that in games with identical interests, the beliefs generated by fictitious play converge to a mixed equilibrium of the game. In Monderer and Shapley (1993b) , it is noted that the class of games with identical interests includes the class of "weighted" potential games. In SECTION 5, I show that in all "ordinal" potential games (a broader class than weighted potential games) as well as all games with identical interests, all minimal inclusive sets will be singletons consisting of strict equilibria (subject again to the genericity of payoffs).
Lastly, Kandori and Rob (1992) identify a class of symmetric two player games in which their evolutionary model (Kandori and Rob (1992a) following Foster and Young (1990) and Kandori, Malaith and Rob (1992a) ) will converge in the particular sense they specify (see discussion in SECTION 6, infra) . These are games with "bandwagon effects," wherein the benefit of switching to a given action is greatest when all others are using that action. In SECTION 6, I show that in almost all such games, all minimal inclusive sets are singletons consisting of pure equilibria. 
In any given game G, the whole set of profiles A is inclusive as is the set of rationalizable profiles (Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) ). Any strict Nash equilibrium, regarded as a singleton, is inclusive, but Nash equilibria that are not strict are not inclusive. GAME 1, infra, has three inclusive sets, the whole set of profiles and the two strict equilibria taken as singletons. 
Such subsets "exclude" all profiles that are "never best response" on E. An exact set is both inclusive and exclusive. All equilibria, whether or not they are strict, are exclusive sets when regarded as singletons. Moreover, the set of rationalizable profiles is the largest exclusive set (Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) ) and hence the largest exact set as well. The whole set of profiles may not be exact or exclusive.
There is an interesting duality between inclusive and exclusive sets, as laid out in Sanchirico (1994) . While inclusive sets are closed under intersection, exclusive sets are closed under (factorwise) union. Hence, for every subset of profiles there is a smallest inclusive set containing that subset as well as a largest exclusive set contained in that set. Lastly, while this smallest containing inclusive set may be found by a process of iterated addition of best responses (starting from the contained subset), the largest contained exclusive set may be found by a process of iterated elimination of never best responses. One's first guess might be that minimal inclusive sets are small in games with much common interest and large in games that exhibit conflict. The only minimal inclusive sets in GAME 1, for instance, are the two pure equilibria, while the entire set of profiles is minimal in the familiar zero-sum game, matching pennies. But the intuition is generally false. Some games that seem to exhibit a large degree of "common interest" have large minimal inclusive sets. In GAME 2, for instance, the entire set of profiles is minimal inclusive, though the two players have a strong mutual interest in playing P, P 1 6. Inversely, games of "pure conflict" may have small minimal inclusive sets. GAME 3, "Augmented Matching Pennies" is a zero sum game (in which all profiles are rationalizable) whose only minimal inclusive set is its unique pure equilibrium,
After the requisite definitions, I provide the fairly straightforward argument that serves as a "template" for the succeeding results on the specific classes of games considered in the following sections.
DEFINITION 3 [Restriction of Game to a Subset of Action Profiles]:
Let G A = ,π 1 6 be a finite game. Let E be a rectangular subset of A. The restriction of G to E,, denoted G E is the finite normal form with strategy sets E i and payoffs π i E .
DEFINITION 4 [Restrictability to
Inclusive Sets]: Let P be a property defined on games in Γ . The property P is restrictable to inclusive sets, if for all games G with the property and all inclusive sets I in G, the restriction G I of G to I also has the property. EXAMPLE 3: The property: "has no more than one (pure strategy 13 ) equilibrium" is restrictable to inclusive sets, since all equilibria in the restriction of G to an inclusive set are equilibria in G as well.
This property is not, however restrictable to general subsets of profiles. For example, GAME 3 has one pure equilibrium, yet in the restriction of GAME 3 to M B M R , ,
; @ ; @ × , both diagonal profiles are pure equilibria.
The property "has no less than one (pure) equilibrium" is not restrictable even to inclusive sets. Again considering GAME 3, if the "1/2'"s and "-1/2'" are replaced by zeros, then the whole game would have one pure equilibrium, (B,R), but the restriction of the game to
; @ ; @ × , now an inclusive set, has no pure equilibrium.
REMARK 2: The property P can, of course, be the conjunction or disjunction of several properties. Proof: Let G have property P as well as the property, call it ′ P , that all its (pure) equilibria are strict. Consider any minimal inclusive set I for G. Since both P and ′ P are restrictable to inclusive sets, the restriction of G to I, G I , has a strict equilibrium, a . Since I is inclusive, a must also be a strict equilibrium for G. But all strict equilibria, as singletons, are inclusive sets.
Therefore, since I is minimal, it must consist solely of this equilibrium, a .
REMARK 3: It is clear from the proof that the property in the statement of the theorem need only be restrictable to minimal inclusive sets.
Minimal Inclusive Sets and Mixed Equilibria
As a first application of the general result, I consider the class of games whose "mixed extensions" have the property that the support of every equilibrium contains a pure equilibrium.
This class includes games whose mixed extensions have only pure equilibria. But, as Gul, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990) have shown, all generic games with more than one equilibrium have a non degenerate mixed equilibrium. Hence, this latter class is essentially the same as the class of games whose mixed extensions have a unique equilibrium in pure strategies. This includes, for example, the zero sum GAME 3, supra.
Along the way to the main result, I consider the general relationship between mixed equilibria (in the mixed extension) and minimal inclusive sets. "exact set" and "minimal inclusive set" are readily extended to the mixed extension.
Mixed equilibria and minimal inclusive sets are obviously related by the fact that if a mixed extension of a minimal inclusive set contains a (mixed) equilibrium of (the mixed extension of) G, then the support of that equilibrium must of course be contained in that minimal inclusive set. However, two complications make the connection between the support of mixed equilibria and minimal inclusive sets less than straightforward. There is then no reason to believe that any given mixture of these two profiles is best response to any belief on E i − .
From this fact arises the possibility that the mixed extension of a minimal inclusive set may not necessarily be minimal inclusive. Consider, for example, the zero sum game, GAME 3 (Augmented Matching Pennies). Modify the game slightly by replacing the "0" payoff in the southeastern most cell with a "1." Then the entire set of profiles is minimal inclusive. But Row, for example, would never want to mix T and M with equal weight, since B dominates this mixed strategy. Therefore, the mixed extension of the entire set of profiles cannot be minimal inclusive.
EXAMPLE 5: As noted an inclusive set will contain the support of any mixed equilibrium in its mixed extension. However, the mixed extension of a minimal inclusive set may contain more than one mixed equilibrium. Non-generic examples are trivial to construct. For a robust example, consider GAME 4. It is easy to check that the game has no pure equilibria and the only inclusive set is the entire set of profiles. Hence, the game has one minimal inclusive set. Yet the mixed profiles Proof: First, I work with the mixed extension and establish a one to one map from the mixed extension's minimal inclusive sets to its mixed equilibria. Next, I establish a one to one map from the minimal inclusive sets of the finite game to the minimal inclusive sets of the mixed extension.
The existence of the composite one to one map proves the result.
Consider the mixed extension ′ G , of G. As noted by Basu and Weibull (1990) , each compact inclusive set in ′ G contains, by the usual fixed point argument, a Nash equilibrium of the mixed extension ′ G . Basu and Weibull (1990) also show that every minimal inclusive set ′ I in ′ G is exact. From this it follows that every minimal inclusive set in ′ G is compact and therefore contains an equilibrium. Now minimal inclusive sets must be disjoint, since inclusive sets are closed under intersection. Hence, no equilibrium for ′ G is contained in more than one minimal inclusive set in ′ G . Therefore, there are no more minimal inclusive sets in the mixed extension ′ G than there are mixed equilibria therein.
To show that this implies that the same holds for the finite game G, it suffices to show that the set of minimal inclusive sets in G can be mapped one to one into the set of minimal inclusive sets in ′ G . Take any minimal inclusive set I in the finite game G. Consider the mixed extension, I' of I. While I' is not necessarily minimal inclusive, it is easy to show that it must at least be inclusive. Since it is also compact, it must contain a minimal inclusive set ′ I in ′ G , as
shown by Basu and Weibull (1991) . In this manner we associate each minimal inclusive set in G with one minimal inclusive set in ′ G . Since minimal inclusive sets in G are disjoint, it follows that this association must be one to one.
It is trivial that minimal inclusive sets exist in all finite games. One simply starts with the whole set of profiles (an inclusive set) and then proceeds to smaller and smaller inclusive sets iii) π i has increasing differences 19 in a i and a i − .
REMARK 6 [Discussion of Supermodular Games]: If strategy spaces are completely ordered, then they are complete lattices. Moreover, the requirement that π i be supermodular becomes vacuous, and the class of supermodular games collapses into those with "strategic complementarities," as enforced by the requirement of "increasing differences:" that is, games in which players best responses increase (in the specified complete ordering) in the strategies of their opponents. In the broader class of supermodular games the requirement that players' strategy spaces are completely ordered is relaxed to the requirement that they be complete lattices. Added is the condition that π i be supermodular in a i on this complete lattice --roughly, that the dimensions of players' strategy spaces are complementary "inputs" in producing payoffs. 
E be a rectangular subset of profiles in A. If each E i is a complete lattice in its own right, then the restriction of G to E is a supermodular game.
Proof: Each E i is a complete lattice by assumption and the other requirements in the definition of supermodular games clearly survive restriction to E.
REMARK 7: A stronger assumption for this lemma would be that A i is a complete sublattice of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) REMARK 8: Actually, one can prove a bit more, namely: every minimal inclusive set that is a complete lattice in its own right is a singleton consisting of a pure equilibrium.
20
Since any subset of a completely ordered set is also completely ordered, we obtain: 0 1  0 0  11  , , , , , , , 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 < A , and endow this set with usual product ordering on ℜ 2 , so that, for example, d is the largest element, c, the smallest and a and b are unrelated. Then both player's strategy spaces are complete lattices.
Assign payoffs to the players as in GAME 5. (Zeros are not shown). Then payoffs are supermodular for both players: fixing any column, for instance, we see that the sum of payoffs to
Row for a and b are never greater than the sum of her payoffs for c and d. In addition, both players' payoffs have increasing dif and only iferences: the benefit to Row (perhaps negative) of increasing his strategy from a to d, for instance, is no less when Column plays d then when column plays a,b or c.
Therefore, the game is supermodular. However, the subset of profiles a b a b , ,
; @ ; @ × is minimal inclusive. Moreover, the example is robust to changes in payoffs.
Potential Games, Congestion Games and Games with Identical Interests
Ordinal, weighted and exact potential games as well as games with identical interests were introduced to the literature on learning in two recent papers, Monderer and Shapley (1993a and b) . The former paper proves a convergence result for fictitious play in games with identical interests. The latter defines the three nested types of potential games, shows that the class of games with identical interests includes the middle type, weighted potential games, and proves the equivalence of the smallest class, exact potential games to Rosenthal's (1973) 
The game G is a w-potential game if it admits a w-potential function. When not interested in the identity of the weights, we say that such P is a weighted potential function and such G, a weighted potential game.
As noted by Monderer and Shapley (1993b) , the class of weighted potential games is a subclass of the class of games with identical interests, considered below.
DEFINITION 11 [Exact Potential Game; Monderer and Shapley (1993b) ]: A function P A : → ℜ is an (exact) potential for the finite normal form game G A = ,π 1 6, if it is a wpotential for G with weight w i = 1, for all i. The game G is an (exact) potential game it is admits an exact potential function.
As noted by Monderer and Shapley (1993b) 
Games with Identical Interests
A game with identical interests is simply one whose "best response regions" correspond to those of a game with identical payoffs. As noted by Monderer and Shapley (1993a) 
Games with Bandwagon Effects
Kandori, Malaith and Rob (1992) and Kandori and Rob (1992a) , following Foster and Young (1990) , consider an evolutionary model in which a fixed finite population of players are repeatedly and randomly paired to play a given finite two player stage game. The process takes the form of a Markov chain whose state vector is the number of players in the population using each (pure) strategy in the stage game. Transition probabilities are determined by two factors.
The first is myopic best response play with "inertia." Players "tend" to take the same action this period as they did last period. But there is always some fixed probability that each member of the population will instead choose an action that is best response to the population distribution of actions taken last period. The second factor is "mutation." In each period there is some small probability that any given member of population switches to any given action, whether or not it is best response to last period's population distribution. For each set of parameters, the resulting Markov chain has a unique stationary distribution. Taking the limit of this distribution as the probability of mutation goes to zero gives the "limit distribution." The "long run states" are those which receive positive probability thereunder.
For general games this Markov process will not necessarily converge in the sense that the limit distribution will not put unit weight on one state. However, in Kandori and Rob (1992b) , the authors identify a class of two player symmetric games wherein the only long run state is one in which everyone in the population plays some Nash equilibrium. These are games with the marginal bandwagon property with the property of increasing differences used in defining supermodular games. Increasing differences says that, given the ordering on strategy spaces, the "larger" your opponent's strategy, the greater the benefit of "increasing" your own strategy. The marginal bandwagon property says that the benefit of switching to a given strategy (whether that be an increase or a decrease) is (strictly) greatest when your opponents are using that strategy as well. A two player, three strategy game with (1,1) on the main diagonal and (0,0) elsewhere has the marginal bandwagon property but, one can show that it can not exhibit increasing differences for any pair of partial orderings (which are, by definition, antisymmetric) on the strategy spaces.
Mathematically, the marginal bandwagon property has the very strong implication that if an action ′ a "beats" a against a itself ( π π a a a a , , 1 6 1 6 − ′ <0 ), then it beats a against every other (pure) action as well, since then π π a a a a , , ′′ − ′ ′′ < 1 6 1 6 0 a and action ′′ a is chosen independently of a and ′ a . In short, if an action beats a against itself, then it strictly dominates a . The contrapositive of this assertion is that if a is undominated, then it must be a symmetric (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium. 21 Since every game contains some undominated strategy, we have that every game with the marginal bandwagon property contains a pure and strict equilibrium. Moreover, the marginal bandwagon property is, on its face, restrictable to inclusive sets (indeed to all sets). Therefore, THEOREM 1 (Template) is again applicable.
It should be noted that even though the definition of the marginal bandwagon property uses strict inequality, not all pure equilibria need be strict: consider the two by two symmetric game in which the players choose H or T and all payoffs are 1 except when the player is alone in choosing H, in which he gets -1. This game has the marginal bandwagon property, but H,H is a nonstrict pure equilibrium. 2 Such research includes (but is not limited to) Crawford (1992) , Foster and Young (1990) , Kreps (1988 and 1992) , Fudenberg and Levine (1993a and b) , Gul (1991 ), Jordan (1991b , Kalai and Lehrer (1993) , Kandori, Malaith and Rob (1992) , Kandori and Rob (1992a) , Krishna (1991 ), Li Calzi (1992 , Milgrom and Roberts (1991) , Monderer and Shapley (1993a and b) , Nyarko (1992a) , Sanchirico (1993) . 3 The model is set in the usual repeated game framework, but the two key assumptions are stated in terms of the likelihood of beliefs and actions conditional on the history of play. The model shows how convergence of belief and action may follow from the interaction of two seemingly unrelated "forces," both of which seem present in real world interaction. The first force consists of the feedback produced when certain types of histories, "inclusive sets," are subjected to the assumption that the more often a subset of stage game profiles has been played in, the more likely it is to be "salient" in players' beliefs regarding play in the incipient stage game. A subset of action profiles is "salient" at t when players believe either that their opponents will play again in (their factors of) that subset, or that their opponents believe that their opponents will do so, or
